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ABSTRACT
Towards the end of 2017, as has been the case every year, the Kwekwe City 
Council produced a budget outlining its various activities for the 2018 financial 
year. The unveiling of the 2018 budget was, among other things, accompanied 
by disgruntlement, confrontation, street protests and dejection by the inhabit-
ants of the City. At the centre of the problem, city inhabitants argued, was the 
failure of the City Council to proactively engage and involve them in the budget 
formulation and claims that previous budgets have failed to tackle poor service 
delivery. On the other hand, the City Council (comprising the administration 
and elected officials) rebutted these claims although there was general accept-
ance that the level of service delivery does not meet the expectations of the 
citizens of Kwekwe. The article, in the context of contributing to the debate on 
good governance, challenges the claim that the budgeting process in the City of 
Kwekwe is participatory.
Keywords:  good governance, budget formulation, service delivery, participatory 
budgeting
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INTRODUCTION
The City of Kwekwe Council is one of Zimbabwe’s seven city councils. The Council 
administers the City of Kwekwe which is located in the Midlands Province of Zimbabwe. 
It has always prided itself as a paragon of participatory budgeting in Zimbabwe. Towards 
the end of every year, it has become a ritual that the Council engages the residents of 
the city in coming up with its annual budget (Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe 
2006:19). Seemingly, two factors have influenced the adoption of participatory budget-
ing by the City of Kwekwe. One is the notion of good governance as a prerequisite for 
sustainable service delivery and the other is the increased citizens’ demands that influ-
ence the notion of participation in local government affairs. The article submits that the 
implementation of participatory budgeting in the City of Kwekwe has not always been 
as robust, momentous and transformative as officially claimed. The article introduces 
the concept of participatory budgeting before analysing its application in the City of 
Kwekwe. Conclusive remarks are then given.
INTRODUCING PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING
The concept of participatory budgeting has been defined in many ways. Shah (2007:21) 
defines participatory budgeting as a ‘decision-making process through which citizens 
negotiate and deliberate over the distribution of public resources’ in local government. 
As defined by Wampler (2000:3), participatory budgeting is a process that improves the 
quality of democracy by supporting open citizen participation and debates on budget-
ary allocations, thus strengthening people’s knowledge of civic affairs. Avritzer (2000:9) 
defines participatory budgeting as a ‘process of civic deliberation on the allocation of 
budget resources’. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT 
2008:2) defines participatory budgeting as ‘a process through which the population de-
cides or contributes to decisions made on the destination of all or part of the available 
public resources’. It can be deduced from these various definitions that participatory 
budgeting relates to the direct citizen involvement in the determination of expenditure 
priorities at the local level.
Participatory budgeting programs can be generally classified into two categories. The 
first category focusses on specific service delivery projects (also called specific public 
works projects). These may include the construction of road networks, schools, clinics, 
recreational facilities and so on. The second category focuses on the democratisation of 
policy making within local government and the ordinary people participate in municipal 
administration through setting broad priorities for the public spending agenda, among 
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other contributions (Wampler 2012:37, 38). Participatory budgeting commenced in the 
municipality of Porto Alegre, the capital of Brazil’s southernmost state, Rio Grande do 
Sul, in 1989 (Leduka 2009:4). It was the brainchild of the Workers’ Party, a political 
party that won, in 1988 the mayorship of the Porto Alegre and had campaigned on a 
platform to reverse the practice of spending more resources in the affluent suburbs of 
the city while neglecting the poorer neighbourhoods. The political party also sought 
to involve ordinary people, especially previously marginalised segments of the popu-
lation including women and the poor in the budgetary process and most importantly, 
in coming up with spending policies. The Workers’ Party, upon winning the mayor’s 
office, realised it had inherited a bankrupt municipality and to overcome this constraint, 
it experimented with many models of improving revenue and democratising spending 
policies (Goldfrank 2012:99).
Importantly, the Workers’ Party, breaking with a past in which budgetary issues were 
among other things characterised by bureaucracy, clientelism, and corruption, provided 
for ordinary people, as part of reorienting spending priorities, to have a direct role in 
government activities and budget decisions (Matovu 2007:7). Through the Citizens’ 
Forums or Commissions, ordinary people were given the platform to shape service deliv-
ery priorities (Wampler 2012:22). The priorities were then examined and refined by the 
Participatory Budget Council consolidated into a proposed budget which was submitted 
to the Camara de Vereadores (City Council) for consideration of adoption.
The City of Porto Alegre committed human and financial resources to ensure that par-
ticipatory budgeting succeeded. Since it began implementing participatory budgeting, 
the City has recorded progress in the service delivery areas of, social services, educa-
tion, health, basic sanitation and water, housing and street paving (Matovu 2007:7). The 
City’s version of participatory budgeting, has since been reproduced with variations and 
was endorsed by the United Nations in 2000 as ‘one of 42 best practices in urban gov-
ernance’ (Goldfrank 2012:93). Since then, thousands of cities around the world have 
adopted participatory budgeting.
Wampler (2012:21) argues that participatory budgeting reduces social exclusion, clien-
telism and corruption by placing historically marginalised people at the centre of public 
deliberation of important policy issues. It may diminish local government inefficiencies, 
promotes transparency and through a sequence of institutional rules, create opportuni-
ties for ordinary people to not only engage in policy debates but to decide, within a local 
government jurisdiction, “how and where resources should be spent.” He further states 
that participatory budgeting thrive when there are four conditions in place: a budget to 
fund service delivery projects selected and advocated by inhabitants, a conducive and 
Volume 10 number 4 • December 2018 199
supportive political environment (and insulation of participatory budgeting from attacks 
by national government), a reformist civil society prepared to engage in rigorous policy 
debates and proactive and robust mayoral support (Wampler 2012:24).
According to Moynihan (2012:55) participatory budgeting is crucial for purposes of refining 
the accountability and performance of local government that is “outdated, unrepresentative, 
and underperforming”. In this regard, four arguments are argued to underpin the emergence 
of participatory budgeting: the need for participative engagement at the policy formulation 
and implementation levels, cynicism of bureaucratic procedures of governance, idealisa-
tion of democracy and the need for more transparent, open and participatory decision-
making (Moynihan 2012:56). Underlying the need for participatory budgeting are greater 
demands for ordinary people to involve themselves in public issues in the context of liberal 
democracy, disenchantment with formal institutions such as government, distrust of political 
formations and a weakening of the compassionate perspective of authority.
According to Goldfrank (2012:99) there are many factors critical to the success of participa-
tory budgeting. These include sufficient resources (especially revenue to support investment 
in service delivery), a civil society disposed to engage robustly in municipal affairs, the pres-
ence of technically sound human resources in the local government administration, statutes 
promoting public involvement in municipal decisions, political will and a commitment to 
fiscal and political decentralisation. Goldfrank (2012:99) also underscores the importance 
of the mayoral role in coordinating and directing the budgetary process, a set-up, which he 
argues, promotes, nurtures and encourages debate and engagement in budget decisions. 
The generous allocation of decision-making powers, accessibility of rules and protocols 
governing the allocation of resources for service delivery and the existence of laws that foil 
the manipulation of participatory budgeting by politicians are also important.
Folscher (2012:127) lists a number of benefits associated with participatory budgeting at 
the local level. Participatory budgeting in the allocation and use of public funds may im-
prove the effectiveness of local government. It can improve the suitability of service de-
livery interventions to the preferences and wishes of the inhabitants they are envisioned 
to assist. Participatory budgeting has the potential to enhance public policy formulation 
and implementation as well as to accord the poor and marginalised a voice over lo-
cal government policy decision making. The Poverty Reduction Forum Trust (2016:1–3) 
states that participatory budgeting can improve accountability, transparency and the 
quality of democracy. Further, participatory budgeting may enable ordinary people to 
acquire treasured skills for classifying, examining and ranking developmental local gov-
ernment issues. It can also enhance the opportunities for residents and locally elected 
officials to share decision-making powers.
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Goldfrank (2012:99) argues that, through collaborative work with intended beneficiaries, 
participatory budgeting can enhance a sense of trust and mutual understanding to de-
velop, and for local officials to appreciate the relevance of existing service delivery inter-
ventions and the conditions under which sustainable service delivery can be realised. By 
working together, different stakeholder groups can develop mutual understanding and 
trust among themselves and can learn how to collaborate on any follow-up activities and 
any future joint initiatives. Thus, participatory budgeting facilitates for service delivery 
needs to be shaped by the beneficiaries and to be determined by the actual needs of the 
people (McCracken (2004:2).
PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN 
THE CITY OF KWEKWE
In the City of Kwekwe Council, the process of budgeting begins with the treasurer present-
ing budget guidelines which are presented to departmental heads budget guidelines meet-
ing (Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe 2006:29). Each department then prepares 
its bid for the coming year. The departmental heads of the council then consolidate the 
bids into a document containing the proposals for all departments. The proposals are then 
presented to the Ad Hoc Budget Committee where the proposals are reviewed before they 
are presented to the wards for discussion by the residents of the city. The next stage is a 
plenary session at council chambers where each ward represented brings forward its ward 
input into the budget. The Ad Hoc Budget Committee then presents the proposed budget 
to the special finance committee composed of all councillors. Following this, the proposed 
budget is presented to council for endorsement. Upon its approval, the budget, accompa-
nied by a certificate signed by the mayor confirming city dwellers were consulted during 
the budget making process, is forwarded to the minister responsible for local government 
for the approval of the tariffs in the budget as required by section 288 of the Urban Councils 
Act (chapter 29:15), which regulates the activities of city councils.
As can be observed from the above description of the budgeting making process in the 
City of Kwekwe, the orientation of the structures of council are far from being configured 
to facilitate participatory processes. The organogram, bureaucratic culture, administra-
tive structures and human resources skills of the local bureaucrats, remain ideal for top-
down decision-making. Decision-making is, in the traditional sense, vertical and is based 
on linear processes that are inimical to participatory budgeting, the devolution of power 
and shared decision-making (Thomas 2013:5). The fact that the bids are presented to the 
wards for discussion would suggest that participatory budgeting in the City of Kwekwe is 
tokenistic and at most meant to hoodwink unsuspecting city residents into endorsing a 
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budget that has already been crafted to reflect rationality and narrow sectional interests 
in the eyes of the local bureaucracy.
To appreciate the structural deficiencies of the model of participatory budgeting used 
in the City of Kwekwe, it is worthwhile that we compare it briefly with the model of 
participatory budgeting implemented in the municipality of Porto Alegre. Participatory 
budgeting in the City of Porto Alegre is bottom-up in its orientation and the institutional 
arrangements are better placed to link budgeting, policy making and citizen participa-
tion. Ordinary citizens, especially historically excluded people are located at the centre 
of budget decisions in the system. Decision-making authority is transferred to citizens, 
away from the technocrats and councillors. In this regard the inhabitants of the city, 
through Citizens’ Forums or Commissions, participate meaningfully in coming up with 
the priorities of the city’s service delivery budget (Wampler 2012:22). The list of priorities 
is submitted to the Participatory Budget Council composed of elected delegates. The 
Budget Council, influence and examine the entire budget before it is submitted to the 
Camara de Vereadores (City Council) for consideration.
In the City of Kwekwe, on the other hand, the implementation of the budgetary process 
is top-down. Decisions about what is incorporated in the budget is the responsibility of 
the councillors and bureaucrats. The existence of an Ad Hoc Budget Committee would 
suggest inclusive and participatory budgeting. The reality is somewhat different. Given the 
politicisation of participatory budgeting in Zimbabwe, the representatives of civil society 
tend to be proxies of the political party with most councillors in an urban local author-
ity and the same applies to Ad Hoc Budget Committee of the City of Kwekwe. Viewed 
this way, the Budget Committee does not offer any guarantees that the wishes of ordinary 
people will filter into the final budget (Sibanda 2005:3). Because of politicisation and politi-
cal patronage, the Budget Committee becomes an appendage of the Finance Committee 
to which it recommends a budget proposal. As if this drawback is not enough, the budget 
proposals are finalised through the Finance Committee and Full Council, both of which are 
traditional council committees historically chastised for not tapping into the needs of the 
ordinary people but those of the local bureaucracy and councillors.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The article uses primary and secondary research methods to assess participatory budget-
ing in the City of Kwekwe. The article, using the survey methodology, draws on the 
experiences and perceptions of the city dwellers on the implementation of participatory 
budgeting. In this regard, 100 questionnaires and interviews were used to gather data 
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and insight into the participation of the City’s inhabitants in the creation of council’s 
2018 budget. The random sampling method was used to target those who participated in 
the study. Half of the respondents were female and the other half male. In addition, the 
article draws on literature in books, journal articles, and other publications in assessing 
the model of participatory budgeting implemented in the City of Kwekwe. The following 
is a catalogue of the city dwellers’ perceptions and experiences.
PARTICIPATION
Definitional certainty and knowledge of the existence of policy is a good starting point 
in assessing ordinary people’s perceptions of participatory budgeting. Only 44% of the 
respondents said they understood what participatory budgeting meant. The majority 
of those who said they could define the concept had diplomas and university degrees 
and resided in the affluent suburbs in the cities. The majority of the respondents (about 
56%) indicated that they did not understand what the concept meant reside in the poor 
suburbs of the cities in the study. Clearly, the concept participatory budgeting remains 
idealistic for the majority and efforts meant to involve the poor in budgeting are mov-
ing at a snail’s speed and might take much longer than anticipated to be realised. The 
glaring gaps in the appreciation of the concept between those living in the affluent and 
poverty-stricken suburbs of the city seems to affirm that ordinary citizens have remained, 
as was the case before the introduction of the concept, on the margins of mundane 
efforts meant to make urban local government more participatory.
The respondents classified their involvement in local government as either consultation 
or participation. Consultation was defined as the process of inquiring from the people 
what they thought about issues contained in a budget already drawn up by council-
lors and the heads of the departments of the council. Participation was defined as the 
process by which the respondents, working alongside council staff, drew up the service 
delivery budget. About 60% of the sample in the survey classified their involvement as 
consultation and not participation. Among the local bureaucrats, there was a tendency 
to conflate consultation with participation, even though the former was passive and 
the latter active. This observation ties in with the finding that participatory budgeting 
in Zimbabwe is weak contrary to the assertions made by most urban local government 
officials (Bland 2010:4).
Simplification and idealisation of communities is an issue for which participatory budget-
ing has borne the brunt of criticism. The inhabitants of cities have varied service deliv-
ery demands. By sharing identical geography and socio-economic considerations, one 
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cannot conclude, as participatory budgeting does, that the inhabitants of council wards 
have similar service delivery demands. Different stakeholders will have different, and 
sometimes conflicting, values and interests and it will be impossible to satisfy all the 
needs expressed. Rather than seeking an artificial or forced consensus, it is important 
to strengthen the capacity of weaker groups to articulate their needs and concerns. It is 
argued that by assuming identical needs, participatory budgeting adopts a less pragmatic 
approach to the allocation, in the budget of resources for which there is stiff competition 
by inhabitants with varying needs to access.
An additional problem is that city dwellers do not participate in the entire budget pro-
cess. Rather, their participation is confined to planning expenditure of specific short-term 
service delivery projects, which is a tiny segment of the total budget. Calls by inhabitants 
for the City to disclose the salaries of local bureaucrats which have consistently chewed 
well over seventy percent of the overall budget have fallen on deaf ears. Salaries are an 
aspect of the overall expenditure shrouded in secrecy and calls by elected officials and 
national government for transparency are disregarded (Coutinho 2010:83). The exclu-
sion of the inhabitants of the City is a narrative also witnessed in the revenue planning or 
the setting of rates and tariffs. The views of ordinary people in revenue planning take the 
form of recommendations and even then, there is no guarantee that they will be incorpo-
rated in the final budget. Expenditure and revenue planning continue, to be dominated 
by the local bureaucrats, undermining the concept of participatory budgeting.
The other challenge is that the Urban Councils Act is silent on the issue of participatory 
budgeting. The Act is not alignment with section 264(2) of the 2013 Constitution of 
Zimbabwe which guarantees ‘the right of communities to manage their own affairs 
and to further their development’. Such a right, arguably, include the right to directly 
and indirectly shape the determination of local expenditure priorities. Another chal-
lenge is that citizens often lack an understanding and awareness of policy-making and 
budgetary processes. As a result, they are often unable to make use of structures and 
procedures feeding into the budget formulation process. It has also been argued that 
people with low education levels are inclined to participate less (Goldfrank 2012:99). 
The reasons for this include: people mistrust in the meaningfulness of the institutions 
and processes for participatory budgeting, inability to access information critical to 
decision-making, an unclear regulatory basis for public engagement in budgeting, 
the poor linkage between planning, budgeting and implementation, and failure to 
comprehend cumbersome municipal procedures, among others (Folscher 2012:152). 
Consequently, elite capture of participatory budgeting conjures uncertainty, and the 
culture of local government officials dominating budgeting is not challenged but rein-
forced (Folscher 2012:184).
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PARALLEL STRUCTURES
Nearly 60% of the respondents indicated that participatory budgeting created a parallel 
structure. The creation of a parallel structure sidesteps existing planning systems and 
alienates formal and existing planning mechanisms associated with the development of 
local government in Zimbabwe, including the role of councillors as elected officials. 
The inclusion of ordinary citizens previously marginalised is based on the terms and 
parameters set by prevailing constructions of development assistance. Further, although 
participatory budgeting is associated with neoliberal agendas, it scarcely addresses is-
sues of personal, intersubjective and structural power (Cornwall 2003:1326). The other 
problem is that city inhabitants are, in predetermined circumstances and policy goals, 
enlisted in the name of social transformation, to support pre-shaped expenditure policy 
agendas. The assertion to all-inclusiveness shakes in the face of the question about who 
participates, decides and benefits from the budget process.
As participation in the budgetary process is optional and not compulsory, it is an initia-
tive that tends not to be broadly representative of the population, and its claim to mean-
ingful dialogue that transforms fundamentally the allocation of resources in a budget is 
contested. The engagement of the people is one side of the equation and the other side 
often forgotten is the willingness on the side of local governments to provide information 
and to engage proactively and in good faith in participatory budgeting. An acceptance 
of a new culture characterised by openness, collaboration, shared approaches, and the 
willingness on the part of the local government to experiment and embrace bottom-
up approach is crucial to the success of any participatory budgeting initiative. Without 
these and other conditions in place, “participatory budgeting programs have a moderate 
capacity to challenge social and political exclusion while promoting social justice” (Shall 
2012:216–219).
The needs of the wards are diverse, each facing a unique context in terms of settlement 
patterns, service needs, revenue access, and capacities (Shall 2012:191). By emphasising 
consensus, the institutions created as part of participatory budgeting do not only mask 
dissent, they also silence dissent. This way, they exacerbate existing forms of exclusion 
(Cornwall 2003:1329). The same projects that appear transformative can turn out to be 
supportive of the status quo. This way, it is often argued, participatory budgeting is to-
kenistic rather than supportive of transformatory practices. Many participatory budgeting 
programs claim that participants make decisions on the entire budget, but there is little 
evidence that participants make meaningful decisions outside of discretionary funding 
(Wampler 2012:35). The other criticism is that participatory budgeting comes out as a 
fine sounding initiative that asserts robust participative engagement without necessarily 
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providing proof. Claims of full participation often point to the powerful in society shap-
ing budgetary decisions (Cornwall 2003:1325).
IS THERE POLITICAL WILL AND A 
SHIFT IN POWER RELATIONS?
Only 45% of the respondents indicated the presence of political will to implement par-
ticipatory budgeting. The other respondents (about 55%) lamented a lack of political 
will when it came to the decentralisation of financial decisions. Interestingly, when it 
came to participatory budgeting, national politicians like parliamentarians and senators 
are perceived as having less political will when compared with local politicians such as 
councillors. Only 60% of the respondents indicated accountability had improved since 
the introduction of participatory budgeting. The remainder (40%) indicated a slight im-
provement in accountability. On the question of whether transparency had improved 
following the introduction of participatory budgeting, 65% indicated they were satisfied. 
The remainder (35%) expressed dissatisfaction. The dissatisfaction emanated from the 
fact that the community meetings on participatory budgeting were often not extensively 
publicised and budget review meetings were often not held at all.
According to Wampler (2012:46), the absence of political will or a strong commitment 
to participatory budgeting by local government leaders, especially mayors, makes it diffi-
cult, if not impossible for participatory budgeting to come to fruition. The fear of the loss 
of influence and power in the local affairs is a chief reason behind politicians at both the 
national and local levels not proactively supporting participatory budgeting. The other 
reason, it can be argued, is that the City Council lacks a reformist tinge and that it was 
not upbeat about full adoption of the tenets of good participatory budgeting drawn from 
the City of Porto Alegre.
Another challenge is that participatory budgeting is politicised. Ruling party supporters 
are more inclined to attend meetings that are chaired by a councillor they elected, and 
boycott meetings called by councillors brought to office on the ticket of the opposition. 
The prevalence of political intolerance, polarisation, and an undemocratic environment 
has undermined the prospects for full implementation of participatory budgeting in the 
City and in other urban settings (Poverty Reduction Forum Trust 2016:4). The local bu-
reaucrats and councillors are seemingly unwilling to delegate authority and create the 
necessary conditions and environment in which participatory budgeting would thrive. 
Whereas in the City of Porto Alegre the Mayor was a political reformist willing to experi-
ment with new institutions, the same cannot be said of the mayor of the City of Kwekwe.
African Journal of Public Affairs206
A few factors explain the weak position of the mayor in the implementation and realisa-
tion of participatory budgeting in the City of Kwekwe. As is the case with all the mayors 
of urban councils elsewhere in Zimbabwe, the mayor of Kwekwe is not, statutorily en-
dowed with any significant powers. The mayor is the ceremonial head of council whose 
responsibilities include receiving and entertaining delegates visiting council, representing 
council in forums, and chairing full council meetings. The mayor is not assigned any 
executive powers and hardly wields any authority and influence over the local bureau-
crats as the political head of council. The mayor is a first among councillors and assumes 
office, not based on mayoral elections but is appointed in the council chambers. The 
Local Government Amendment of 2008 abolished the position of executive mayor and 
restored ceremonial mayors. It can be argued that the abolishment of executive mayors 
might have been motivated by the objective to weaken the opposition, the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC), rather than to improve local government. MDC run 
councils dominated urban local government while the ruling party was relegated to rural 
areas.
In this set up, participatory budgeting hardly represents a fundamental shift in power 
relations from the bureaucracy to the local communities. The bureaucracy is not a pas-
sive facilitator since it is the one that frames the draft budget presented to the people for 
consideration. Through choosing the items in the budget and organising the consultation, 
the bureaucracy controls both the process and content. Consequently, participatory bud-
geting is not seen as facilitating transformation. Rather, participatory budgeting is seen 
as protecting the domination of the bureaucracy over the inhabitants of the city in the 
budgeting process. In fact, ethical considerations beckon as inhabitants are cast in the 
passive role of collaborators who are invited, at the whims and caprices of the bureau-
cracy when budgeting is almost nearing completion.
In the case of the City of Kwekwe Council, the inhabitants of the city are not invited to 
contribute in deciding the items that need to be incorporated in the budget. Rather, they 
are invited to respond to a draft budget that is already framed by the local bureaucracy 
working alongside council. In this arrangement, the inhabitants of the City are not, in 
all purposes and reality engaged in participatory budgeting. On the contrary, it would 
appear, the way the budgeting process is organised forces them to respond and dignify 
the City Council’s perception of an ideal budget. With very little leverage over the docu-
ment submitted to them, the best inhabitants can do is rubber stamp the budget. In this 
situation, the local bureaucracy maintains a vice grip not only on the budget process but 
its contents as well. The balance of power, responsibility and influence, consequently, 
remains with the local bureaucracy. Far from transforming the budget process, participa-
tory engagement exacerbates structural exclusion and entrenches the status quo.
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ASYMMETRIES AND DISPARITIES 
IN SERVICE DELIVERY
Nearly 60% of the respondents indicated that budgets were not yet as responsive as the 
city dwellers wished. It was noted that there was less funding, among other services, 
towards water supply, sewerage and street lighting. The budgets continued to reflect the 
preferences of the elite and that city dwellers played a limited role in the distribution of 
public resources in the city council. A scrutiny of the responses suggest that local gov-
ernment officials enjoy keeping budgetary power to themselves and that collaborative 
decision-making does not still occur in practice. As argued by Arnstein (1969:217), this 
remains one of the striking failures of participatory budgeting.
A cross examination of the budgets over a five-year period failed to establish a consis-
tent pattern in which more resources were now being channelled towards improving 
service delivery in the areas of refuse collection and removal, replacing burst water and 
sewer pipes, repairing pot-holed roads and making water supply reach all the residents 
of the cities. Expenditure priorities were tilted towards salary obligations in defiance of 
the stipulation by national government that seventy percent of the budget goes towards 
investment in service delivery. Nearly 80% of the budget for the City goes towards re-
current expenditure and this has gone on for a long time. The City is not alone in this 
transgression. A study by Bland (2010:5) found that between 28 and 60% of the budgets 
of urban local authorities in Zimbabwe are consumed by salary payments.
A distortion of priorities also manifests in the way funds spared from the ever-ballooning 
recurrent expenditure is used. An analysis of the budgets over the past five years found 
that the City’s budget is far from being redistributive. As in the period before introduction 
of participatory budgeting, investment in infrastructure continues to favour affluent resi-
dential areas. Low-income suburbs with high poverty rates and low levels of infrastruc-
ture in the City continue to receive less spending per capita than affluent suburbs, creat-
ing asymmetries. The argument is that only by increasing the investment of resources 
in lower-income suburbs can the City’s participatory budgeting initiative be said to be 
promoting social justice (Wampler 2012:36).
FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY AND AUTONOMY
Most of the respondents (about 70%) indicated that the City Council needs to incorpo-
rate city dwellers even when it does not have enough independent financial resources. 
That way, it was argued, the City would plan effectively for the scarce resources at its 
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disposal. It is a fact that the ability of the City of Kwekwe Council to implement a budget 
based on participatory budgeting is not unlimited. The City, like other local authorities 
enjoys relative financial autonomy that is guaranteed in the 2013 Constitution. It does 
not enjoy absolute budgetary and revenue powers. National government through the 
ministry responsible for local government wield significant influence on the framing of 
the budgets of subnational entities.
Through policy guidelines, the ministry controls the environment in which the budgets 
are framed. It, for example, sets the threshold for capital and recurrent expenditure. It is a 
legal and policy requirement that the ministry approves the budgets before local govern-
ments can start collecting revenue (Zinyama 2014:33). The responsible minister, contrary 
to the suggestions of city dwellers, is legally authorised to reject the budget submitted to 
him or her for approval, regardless of whether it was the result of participatory budgeting 
or not. Most importantly, the minister is statutorily empowered to consider for approval, 
reject or direct council to amend the tariff for the suburbs where most of the dwell-
ers are classified as low income (local government areas), among other considerations 
(Shall 2012:191).
In approving, rejecting or instructing a local authority to review its rates in the low-income 
suburbs, the minister depends on the wisdom of his or her own assessment and is not guid-
ed by the outcomes of participatory budgeting (Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe 
2006:15). The minister, through exercising governmental powers is also able to encroach on 
the expenditure priorities ordered and agreed between city dwellers and council, minimis-
ing the impact of participatory budgeting. Other ways by which the minister controls the 
expenditure powers of local authorities is through demanding monthly reports, minutes of 
committee meetings of council, monitoring and evaluation visits, rescinding council resolu-
tions, dispatching ministerial auditors, and assuming the expenditure powers of local gov-
ernments. All these measures diminish the impact of participatory budgeting.
Local fiscal realities are also an important equation in the realisation of participatory 
budgeting. The argument is that efforts by city dwellers to influence expenditure pri-
orities ought to conform to the financial constraints placed on the city council by inad-
equate revenue inflows. The danger is always lurking that uninformed residents, through 
participation influence budgets that demand to spend more resources than council can 
raise or than are available (Wampler 2012:39). Given the lack of fiscal capacity bedevil-
ling local government in Zimbabwe and this has been going on for many years, there is 
need to manage the expectations of residents which are usually high and unrealistic. It is 
not unusual for residents to plan and demand prioritisation that is beyond the capacity of 
local government.
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Even when a priority list has been drawn up and agreed on, the local bureaucracy (and 
not the city dwellers) still wield influence in how the budget is implemented. The point 
is that the local bureaucracy is endowed with considerable discretion in the apportion-
ment and allocation of scarce financial resources. While councillors specify the general 
goals in the budget, administratively, it is the duty of the local bureaucrats to assign and 
allocate resources to achieve those policy objectives (Moyhinan 2012:72). In the face of 
a local bureaucracy that is hostile to administrative reforms, participatory budgeting ini-
tiatives are used, not to allocate scarce resources transparently and efficiently but as an 
educational tool. According to Wampler (2012:47), there are many ways through which 
the local bureaucrats and elected councillors can undermine participatory budgeting to 
achieve their own goals. These include non-disclosure of crucial information, developing 
cold feet over the implementation of service delivery projects in the budget, and under-
mining citizen oversight committees (Wampler 2012:47).
Like any other local authorities, the City of Kwekwe Council has been experiencing poor 
revenue collection since 2000 when the economic environment deteriorated (Samukange 
2014:1). Owing to, among other explanations, excessive regulation of the local government 
environment, interference by national government, poor macro-economic fundamentals 
and stunted administrative reforms, the City has perennially struggled to fund service de-
livery projects. That the City Council is cash strapped and the fact that it lacks financial 
stability is reflected in the poor road network, declining health care facilities, poor water 
and sanitation facilities and the outbreak of frequent water borne diseases among other 
indicators. In the absence of financial stability, the likelihood that people historically ex-
cluded from influencing redistributive spending in communities with poor infrastructure 
diminishes. With the City lacking the resources needed to implement the service delivery 
projects selected by ordinary people, participatory budgeting, “shifts from the selection of 
specific public works projects to a more general discussion of debt, taxes, and the efficient 
use of limited resources” (Wampler 2012:25).
CONCLUSION
The model of budgeting implemented in the City of Kwekwe hardly counts as participatory. 
It is top-down in its orientation, allows for the domination of budgeting by the local bureau-
crats and elected councillors, especially the former. The lack of political will, the absence 
of institutional framework guiding its implementation, and the absence of a mechanism for 
city dwellers to make city officials accountable have all rendered the concept of participa-
tory budgeting in the City of Kwekwe tokenistic rather than transformatory. The disconnect 
between the concept of budgeting, people’s involvement and how budgets address service 
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delivery demands, the absence of a culture of promoting devolution, the limited scope of 
participation, legislative constraints, a lack of transparency and trust, a breakdown in com-
munication, insufficient resources, and political differences have also impacted adversely 
on participatory budgeting. The Council of the City of Kwekwe needs to revisit its model 
of budgeting so that it becomes truly participatory by placing ordinary people at the centre 
of the formulation of the annual budget. Currently, the model in use does not represent a 
break with a past in which the heads of council departments and councillors dominated 
budgeting and city dwellers merely watched from the terraces. No wonder, most budgets 
produced by the City Council over the past few years have failed to respond to the needs 
and preferences of the citizens of the City of Kwekwe.
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